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INADEQUACY OF PRISONERS' RIGHTS
Circuit in Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson.'°6 In order to achieve successful
prosecutions against "peddlers and purveyors of smut and despicable
vulgarity,"'1 7 it is not necessary to infringe upon rights guaranteed by the
first amendment. A delicate procedure can be established whereby the
rights of individuals are protected and the interest of society in controlling
the dissemination of obscenity is maintained. Since dissemination of
obscenity is not a crime of violence, some delay in the suppression of
obscene material in order to protect individual rights is not an inordinate
price to ask of society.
Difficult and cumbersome are obscenity prosecutions. Impossible they
are not. State officers should not conclude that the First Amendment
throws an impenetrable mantle of protection over obscenity. The
Constitution offers no protection to pornography without redeeming
literary or artistic qualities. What the courts have done, clumsily
perhaps, is to try to strike a balance between private and public
rights-the right of an individual to free, legitimate expression, on
the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the public to be free
from that expression which is obscene.' 08
This balance should be achieved by rational legislative process rather
than by random case-by-case judicial improvisation.
ALEXANDER P. SANDS, III
The Inadequacy of Prisoners' Rights to Provide Sufficient Protection
for Those Confined in Penal Institutions
Judges spend their lives consigning their fellow creatures to prison;
and when some whisper reaches them that prisons are horribly cruel
and destructive places, and that no creature fit to live should be sent
there, they only remark calmly that prisons are not meant to be
comfortable, which is no doubt the consideration that reconciled
Pontius Pilate to the practice of crucifixion.'
as amended VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-236.4 (Supp. 1968). It is recomnmended that
this statute serve as a guideline for states wishing to enact a specific procedure
for an adversary hearing.
100410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969).
""Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary, 301 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
... Sokolic v. Ryan, 304 F. Supp. 213, 218 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
' G. SHAw, THE CRIME OF IMPRISONMENT 14 (1948). However, Shaw also
said:
When we get down to the poorest and most oppressed of our population,
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The prison is not an institutional septic tank for societal waste; it is
a structural part of a correctional system. "The idea of punishment as
the law interprets it seems to be that inasmuch as a man has offended
society, society must officially offend him."2 Invariably this official act
is that of incarceration. There exists a growing recognition that a convict
is a human being capable of being returned to society as a productive
citizen. This recognition has contributed to the view of the prisoner as one
whose rights have been temporarily subjected to reasonable restrictions,
but not altogether abolished.8 Society's interest in the preservation of the
dignity and self-respect of every human being can no longer tolerate the
view that a convicted criminal "has, as a consequence of his crime, not
only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which
the law in its humanity accords him. He is for the time being the slave
of the State."4 The purpose of this comment is to discuss certain basic
rights of prisoners, sketch remedies for their -enforcement, and evaluate
the adequacy of the constitutional and physical protection that these rights
and remedies in practicality afford to inmates.
THE RIGHTS
In 1965 the American correctional system handled nearly 2.5 million
convicted persons, resulting in an average daily prison population of about
we find the conditions of their life so wretched that it would be impossible
to conduct a prison humanely without making the lot of the criminal more
eligible than that of many free citizens. If the prison does not underbid the
slum in human misery, the slum will empty and the prison will fill.
Id. at 20.
The tragic irony of imprisonment is that it may well result in punishment far in
excess of that intended or contemplated by the sentencing judge. This result arises
from judicial ignorance of, but hopefully not apathy for, the harsh realities of
prison life. In the fall of 1969, Mr. Lee Bounds, the Commissioner of Correction
for the State of North Carolina, intimated in an interview with the writer at the
Institute of Government in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, that the judges of North
Carolina have not availed themselves of the opportunity to visit correctional insti-
tutions. In this regard, Dr. Karl Menninger in THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 73-
74 (1968) made the following comment:
If a doctor sends a man to a hospital to be treated, he goes to see whether
the treatment is being carried on; but judges do not seem to believe in this
principle. judges rarely visit the institutions to which they are constantly
committing their wards to be "treated." Whenever I have taken judges
with me to visit prisons or closely examine prisoners, they have been far
more shocked than I.
'K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 71 (1968).
See Note, Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, WM. & MARY L.
Rlv. 178, 181 (1967).
'Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
[Vol. 48
INADEQUACY OF PRISONERS' RIGHTS
426,000 inmates who were incarcerated in approximately four hundred
adult and three hundred juvenile penal institutions.5 While lawful in-
carceration must necessarily limit many privileges and rights, a prisoner
should not be stripped of any rights except as required for proper admin-
istration and discipline in the correctional institution in which he is
placed. The "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society"' demand improved penal institutions. More and
more often prison administrators are being called upon to justify repressive
measures and unduly restrictive regulations.' Federal courts have begun
to reject the venerable "hands-off" doctrine and to intervene in the
administration of state and federal penal institutions in cases in which
failure to exercise jurisdiction would unreasonably deprive inmates of
constitutional rights.' Nevertheless,
ITHE PRESIDENT'S COmmIssioN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: CORRECIioNS 1, 4, 45-46 (1967).
'Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
TSee generally Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and The Aware-
ness of the Rights of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REv. 669 (1966); Hirschkop &
Milleman, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795 (1969);
Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BUFFALO L. REv. 397
(1965); Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal
to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963); Note, Prisoners'
Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEo. L.J. 1270 (1969) ; Note, Constitutional Rights
of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962).
'The "hands-off" doctrine espoused by federal courts in the past can be stated
in the following manner: inasmuch as Congress has placed control of the federal
prison system under the Attorney General, and inasmuch as the control of a
state prison system is vested in the Governor or his delegated representative, a
federal court is powerless to intervene in the internal administration of this executive
function even to protect prisoners from the deprivation of their constitutional
rights. See United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105
(7th Cir. 1954); Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
822 (1952); Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1951); In re Taylor, 187
F.2d 852 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 955 (1951) (all involving federal
prisons). See also Jackson v. Goodwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968); Walker
v. Blackwell, 360 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1966); Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th
Cir. 1966); Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (all in-
volving state prisons).
The Supreme Court of the United States recently abolished the classical "hands-
off" doctrine in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969), when it said:
Tennessee urges, however, that the contested regulation in this case is
justified as a part of the State's disciplinary administration of the prisons.
There is no doubt that discipline and administration of state detention facili-
ties are state functions. They are subject to federal authority only where
paramount federal constitutional or statutory rights supervene. It is clear,
however, that in instances where state regulations applicable to inmates of
prison facilities conflict with such rights, the regulations may be invalidated.
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[e]normous discretion is left to correctional administrators to define
the conditions of imprisonment. They determine the way in which the
offender will live for the term of imprisonment; how he is fed and
clothed; whether he sleeps in a cell or a dormitory; whether he
spends his days locked up or in relative freedom; what opportunity
he has for work, education, or recreation. They regulate his access
to the outside world by defining mailing and visiting privileges. They
define rules of conduct and the penalties for violation of such rulesY
And even though the "hands-off" doctrine is no longer viable, the require-
ment that administrative remedies be exhausted by federal inmates or that
the aid of state courts first be sought by inmates incarcerated in state
institutions may hamper the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts.10
Two observers of the American penal system have criticized these juris-
dictional barriers: "Such reluctance to protect the constitutionally derived
basic human rights of prisoners is an abdication of judicial responsibility
that has operated to maintain or strengthen the status quo and isolate
penal systems from public scrutiny."'-
Religious Freedom
Freedom of religion, protected by the establishment and free-exercise
clauses of the first amendment, has been invoked most often in the prison
setting by the members of the Black Muslim sect of the Islam religion.12
The case of Howard v. Smyth13 is typical. Howard, a Black Muslim
prisoner, met with prison staff members to demand that Muslim inmates
be permitted to hold services in the prison. Howard refused to divulge
the names of the prisoners whom he represented in making the demand.
He was thereafater confined in a maximum-security cell. The prison
officials stated that the existence of an organized, cohesive group of
unidentified persons within the prison population represented a threat to
prison security; Howard's confinement was necessary because he had
' TASK FORCE REPORT: CoRRECTIONS, supra note 5, at 84.0See e.g., Hess v. Blackwell, 409 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Kelley v. Dowd,
140 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 786, rehearing denied, 321 U.S. 783,
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 712 (1943).
" Hirshkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L.
REv. 795, 812 (1969).
12 See generally Note, Suits by Black Muslim Prisoners to Enforce Religious
Rights, 20 RUTGERS L. REv. 528 (1966).
18 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 988 (1967). The case
is discussed extensively in Note, Constitutional Law--Prisons-Confinement to
Maximum Security as an Abridgement of First Amendment Rights, 45 N.C.L.
REv. 535 (1967).
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assumed leadership of the group. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that such action was an "arbitrary imposition of such serious
disciplinary action where the assertedly offensive conduct bears so close
a relationship to First Amendment freedoms."1 4
No court has ever questioned the right of a prisoner to adhere to a
recognized religious belief, 5 but courts generally tolerate reasonable re-
strictions on the practice of religion in penal instiutions. Even a free
man has no absolute legal right to engage in any religious practice that
he desires.10 Permiting Black Muslim prisoners to communicate by mail
and to visit with ministers of their faith, subject to prison rules, has been
held not to impose such a danger to prison security as to warrant the
prison administration's refusal to permit such communications and visit-
ing." However, an inmate can be punished for disturbing other inmates
through noisy religious discussion.' 8 If it appears that a prisoner can
obtain a balanced diet by voluntarily avoiding pork or food cooked in
grease or lard, a prison is not required to provide a special diet for him
even though his religious belief requires him to abstain from such foods, 9
nor do the members of a religious sect have the right to special dining
hours.20 A prisoner in temporary punitive solitary confinement has no
absolute right to the exercise of his religious beliefs,21 nor does an inmate
confined to maximum security because of a history of his being a security
risk have the right to attend Sunday worship services in the prison
chapel.2 2 A state prison system should not be allowed to interfere un-
x, 365 F.2d at 431.
This statement must be qualified; for some time courts denied that Black
Muslims were members of a religion. In the case of In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663,
361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961), a correctional
officer confiscated Muslim literature, which he called "trash." The court held
that the inmate was not a member of a religious group and that Black Muslims
had no right to assemble and to discuss their beliefs. But in Long v. Parker, 390
F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968) the court held that Black Muslims, as members of a
religion protected by the first amendment, have a right to assert their belief.
"8 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (antipolygamy laws sustained
against claims of interference with Mormon beliefs); Lawson v. Commonwealth,
164 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1942) (use of poisonous snakes in religious ceremonies
prohibited). See McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (App.
Div. 1957), for a comparison of the religious rights of the free man to those of an
inmate.
Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967).
8Evans v. Ciccone, 377 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1967).
'9 Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775, 778 (4th Cir. 1968).
Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963).
" Belk v. Mitchell, 294 F. Supp. 800 (W.D.N.C. 1968).
"' Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969).
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reasonably with an inmate's study of the Bible23 or to deprive one of
his Koran. 4 In Peek v. Ciccone,2 a federal district court upheld the
right of a prisoner who claimed to have undergone an experience reveal-
ing to him that he was the reincarnation of Jesus Christ to communicate
this fact to the Pope.
A major problem in regard to the religious freedom of Black Muslim
inmates was raised in Long v. Parker.6 Can the administrators of a
penal institution, to achieve security and control over the inmates, properly
confiscate Black Muslim literature alleged to be racially inflammatory and
to advocate violence? Black Muslim services were required to be held
in a small room instead of in the chapel. The Muslims were the only
religious group whose members were identified by a list that the prison
administration maintained. Inmates not on the list were not allowed to
attend the Muslim services. Muslim inmates were forbidden to receive
a weekly newspaper Muhammad Speaks and a book by Elijah Mu-
hammad entitled The Message of the Blackman. Both of these publications
were deemed highly inflammatory by prison officials, who decided that
the writings were not legitimate Islamic literature. The federal district
court in Long upheld the actions of the prison administration.27 Respond-
ing to the Muslim inmates' request for a chaplain, the court held that
a prison has no duty to supply a chaplain for every religious sect.28 The
district court also upheld the refusal of prison officials to allow the
Muslims to correspond with Elijah Muhammad since he was an ex-
convict and his writings were considered inflammatory and detrimental
to the goal of rehabilitation.29
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated part of the
decision of the district court and held that "mere antipathy caused by
statements derogatory of and offensive to the white race is not sufficient
" See Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 786 (1944)
(dictum).
", Burns v. Swenson, 288 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
"5288 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
28390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968). An action to enjoin the warden from inter-
ference with religious freedom was begun in Long v. Parker, 235 F. Supp. 246
(M.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 351 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1965), vacated, 384 U.S. 32 (1966).,
Meanwhile, the petitioner brought a second suit based on the same facts and praying
for substantially the same relief in Long v. Katzenback, 258 F. Supp. 89 (M.D. Pa.
1966). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated these two cases and
rendered the opinion discussed in the text.
"'Long v. Katzenback, 258 F. Supp. 89 (M.D. Pa. 1966).28 Id. at 93.
2 1 Id. at 94.
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to justify suppression of religious literature in a prison, nor is mere specu-
lation that such statements may ignite racial or religious riots in the
prison." 30 The court went on to say that in order to justify prohibition
of religious literature, prison officials must prove that it creates a clear
and present danger to prison security and a substantial interference with
the orderly functioning of the institution.31
Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Communication
In any part of society, free speech is not an absolute right ;32 but,
within the confines of a prison, freedom of speech is limited almost to
the point of extinction. There exists no right for inmates to com-
municate with other members of the prison population; speech, corre-
spondence, or other communication between inmates can be completely
prohibited as a reasonable security precaution.3 It is doubtful, however,
that the inmate can be arbitrarily cut off from all access to the outside
world.34 Although some courts have gone so far as to say that there
is no constitutional right to use of the mails by an inmate,
5 most hold
that control over an inmate's mail is basically an administrative function
6
and that prison security and the goal of rehabilitation warrant the exercise
of censorship if prison officials desire. 1
The administrative burden of censoring every piece of correspondence
may justify limiting the number of persons with whom an inmate may
correspond and the number of letters each inmate may send or receive
38
" Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 822 (3d Cir. 1968).
"1Id. at 822. See also Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969).
" E.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 470 (1919) (advocacy of crime or
revolution); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (state-
ments causing boycott in restraint of trade).
"See generally Vida v. Cage, 385 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1967); McClosky v.
Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964); Foster v. Jacob, 297 F. Supp. 299 (C.D.
Cal. 1969). See also Comment, The Right of Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL. L.
REv. 407 (1967).
" See Dayton v. McGranery, 201 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1953). See also cases
cited in notes 52-63 infra.
"Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Medlock v. Burke, 285 F.
Supp. 67 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
" E.g., Pope v. Daggett, 350 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1965), vacated, 384 U.S. 33,
rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 1027 (1966).
'" See Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952); Petition of Smigelski,
185 F. Supp. 283 (D.N.J. 1960); Green v. Maine, 113 F. Supp. 253 (D. Me.
1953); Gerrish v. Maine, 89 F. Supp. 244 (D. Me. 1950).
" See Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965); McCloskey v. Maryland,
337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964); Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954);
Desmond v. Blackwell, 235 F. Supp. 246 (M.D. Pa. 1964).
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Prison authorities may also limit the purpose of the correspondence; for
example, prisoners are generally prohibited from engaging in any business
activities while incarcerated."0 Since the prison system is entitled to con-
trol mail, the mere withholding of a letter from a prisoner as a means of
disciplinary punishment is not a violation of any federally protected
right.
40
Prison authorities are even permitted, for rehabilitative reasons,
to designate the persons with whom an inmate may communicate. In
Fussa v. Taylor41 the court upheld a restriction imposed on a particular
inmate that prevented him from writing his common-law wife, who was
an inmate at a woman's reformatory. The court found that the restriction
had a rational relationship to the legitimate purpose of the prison in
rehabilitating the inmate. In Nuiner v. Miller42 the court denied a pris-
oner's request that he be allowed to continue an English usage corre-
spondence course. He had been prohibited from taking it by the warden,
who found that the inmate intended upon his release to write a book
exposing the savageness of the prison authorities, whom he characterized
as a "sadistic group in charge of the brutality department. ' 4 The court
found, amazingly, that there existed no rehabilitative purpose in the
inmate's continuing to study English usage and that the warden could
ban the activity by refusing to permit the student to mail or receive items
pertaining to the course. In Labat v. McKeithe, 44 correspondence be-
tween a Negro on death row in a Louisiana state prison and a white
woman in Sweden was disallowed by the warden. The court upheld the
warden's authority: "If the state has the right to deprive him of his very
life, through execution for the commission of a capital offense, then
certainly it has the right, as a part of the ultimate punishment, to deprive
him of other privileges along the way to the final reckoning .... ,,4
It is unwise to restrain unduly intra-institutional expression, com-
munication, and some degree of social contact between inmates; these
"See Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951). However, some states
allow correspondence by mail only for business purposes. See Krupnick v. Crouse,
366 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1966), in which the court upheld the refusal by Kansas
state prison officials to mail an inmate's letter because it had no business purpose.
Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954).
"168 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Pa. 1958).




"243 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1965).
Id. at 666.
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practices are an integral part of the development of ideas, of mental
exploration, and of the affirmation of one's self and therefore are beneficial
to the goals of rehabilitation. The power to realize one's potentiality
to function as a human being often begins through self-expression." "In
prison this value is accentuated by the diminished number of outlets for
expression of feelings and desires."'47 Inmates often find ways to channel
their self-expression while incarcerated. In the past five years, nearly
1.2 million dollars-worth of paintings, sculptures and other works of
art have been sold by prisons in the United States; 128 of the 747 prisons
have art programs in which nearly seven thousand prisoners take part,
and many of the inmates actually receive the money from the sales. 48
Other inmates have turned to writing. The public often fails to realize that
many literary works of art are produced behind prison walls. For ex-
ample, John Bunyan's Pilgrims' Progress; Oscar Wilde's Ballad of
Reading Gaol; Jan Valtin's Out of Night; and Caryl Chessman's Cell
2455, Trial By Ordeal, and Face of Justice all were produced in prison
cells.4
Generally these methods of self-expression are a beneficial part of
the rehabilitative process; therefore the question is seldom raised whether
inmates have a constitutionally protected right to engage in such activities
free from unreasonable prison interference. In United States v. Maas,50
the court upheld the decision of the United States Attorney General not
to permit Joseph Valachi, a former member of the Cosa Nostra, to
publish his manuscript describing the existence of a national system of
organized crime because the Attorney General felt that publication would
not assist in law enforcement. However, the Attorney General was
simply enforcing a term of an agreement previously signed by Valachi
that publication was at the government's discretion.
In Payne v. District of Columbia,5' a prisoner's wife petitioned the
court to require the prison authorities to allow her to make conjugal
visits to see her husband. The court denied the request. It is doubtful
that any court would allow conjugal visitations based purely on the right
" See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 879 (1963).
," Comment, The Right of Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 407, 408
(1967).
,Durham Sun, Jan. 4, 1970, § A, at 2, col. 4.
,Comment, The Right of Expression in Prison, supra note 47, at 421 n.68.
80371 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
'253 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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to freedom of expression although such visits are hardly devoid of
rehabilitative benefit.
Access to the Courts
"Reasonable access to the courts is ...a right, being guaranteed as
against state action by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment." The right of access is so valuable that "its administratively un-
fettered exercise may be of incalculable importance in the protection of
rights even more precious."53 Neither warden, guard, nor any other prison
authority may impair an inmate's access to the courts or deny him a
reasonable opportunity to communicate with his attorney to challenge his
conviction or punishment.54
A prisoner's right to access to the courts is secured only if the delivery
of mail to or from an official of the court (as distinguished from an
attorney) is delayed no longer than sorting dictates. Censorship of this
category of mail is unnecessary and inappropriate.", In Talley v. Stephens0
prison authorities, under the guise of moral censorship, acquired the
practice of screening petitions to the courts and refusing to mail those
deemed to contain obscene, abusive, or otherwise objectionable allegations
and statements. The court found this practice improper and noted that
courts were quite able to protect themselves from any improper matters
without the help of prison authorities. The facts found by the court also
indicated that prison authorities often undertook certain actions5 7 in
reprisal for an inmate's attempt to acquire access to the judiciary to
present a grievance. Chastising the prison administration, the court said
that guaranteed access to the judicial process is "hardly actual and
adequate if its exercise is likely to produce reprisals, physical or other-
"2Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 862 (1961). As authority for its statement, the court cited Ex parte Hull,
312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) and White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 762 (1945). As indi-
cated by the court, federal prisoners' access to the courts is guaranteed by the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.
" Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905, 907 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905
(1966).
", Their inclination to do so has been labeled a "conspiracy of silence." Hirsch-
kop & Millemann, The UnMonstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. rmv. 795,
824 (1969). See Blanks v. Cunningham, 409 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1969) (per
curiam).
Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966).
247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
Id. at 690. These actions included beatings by trustees and guards and the
discharging of shotguns at inmates in a near-miss fashion.
[Vol. 48
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wise, from Penitentiary personnel. '5 8 Similarly, the court in Coonts v.
Wainwright" held that state prison officials may not punish inmates for
seeking relief from a federal court; to do so, the court reasoned, would
frustrate the ancient writ of habeas corpus and deny all appeal from an
unlawful commitment.60
Access to the courts does not mean any court but to the appropriate
one, and in that sense to the official of the court designated to receive such
petitions. Thus an inmate is not entitled to send materials directly to
a judge because the clerk of the court is the proper person to receive
petitions."1
The rule abhorring interference with an inmate's access to the courts
does not apply so rigidly to an inmate's communication with his attorney.
Although the prison is not allowed to obstruct attorney-inmate com-
munication, it may inspect mailed communications and make auditory
supervision." However, it would seem that the confidential attorney-
client relationship must be preserved and protected and the contents of
the communications held in the strictest of. confidence.'
The Right to Prepare Legal Material
"Although neither the states nor the federal government may be
obligated to provide law libraries for their inmates or to permit them
to convert their cells into libraries, some opportunities of access to such
materials should be deemed an integral part of access to the courts.
'6 4
Undeniably, the right to prepare one's legal argument is an integral part
of the right to communicate with the courts."5 Less obvious is the duty of
the prison system in this regard. An inmate has no right to practice law
within the confines of a penitentiary,"6 and the state is not required to
"Id.
282 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd per curian, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir.
1968).
"o In Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961), the court implied that
the right to seek relief from the judiciary exists even when the prisoner is in
solitary confinement if such confinement is not temporary or for only a short
period.
" Spires v. Dowd, 271 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1960).
"See Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 151 (1919) ; Cox v. Crouse, 376 F.2d
824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 865 (1967).
a But see Cox v. Crouse, 376 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1967).
" Comment, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 111 U.
PA. L. Rv. 985, 993 (1962). But see Barber v. Page, 239 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.
Okla. 1965).
"Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
a Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990, rehearing
denied, 340 U.S. 847 (1950).
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furnish its inmates lawbooks67 although it cannot deny access to such mate-
rials through channels reasonably utilized by inmates."8
Prison authorities may make rules reasonably restricting preparation.
In Ex parte Wilson69 the court upheld a prison regulation requiring that
all legal papers be prepared in a special "writ room," which had a type-
writer, paper, and legal references. A similar restriction was sustained in
Hatfield v. Bailleaux.7 ° In that case, the prison authorities restricted
preparation of legal documents by the general prison population to the
prison library, which was open approximately thirty hours per week.
Inmates were required to make an advance appointment and were limited
to a three-hour stay for each visit. The court found that at the date of
trial eleven persons were allowed to use the library at one time and that
the maximum delay for library privileges seldom exceeded a day; these
restrictions, it was decided, imposed no undue restraint on access to the
courts.
In Lockhart v. Prasse71 a prison regulation provided that the contents
of all packages sent prisoners must be new and must be mailed directly
from the store where purchased. This regulation frustrated an indigent
inmate's attempt to purchase used law books to aid him in asserting the
illegality of his conviction. The court upheld the regulation because it
was not completely prohibitive; new books could still be bought, at least
in theory, by indigents. Prison rules prohibiting the unauthorized lending
of books have also been upheld,72 as have rules restricting the number of
books and papers a prisoner is allowed to retain in his cell at one time. 7
An issue recently raised by inmates is their right to obtain legal
assistance from other prisoners more experienced and competent in the
art of "writ writing." In DeWitt v. Pail74 the court indicated that prison
authorities could prohibit assistance by other prisoners in legal matters
so long as an inmate's access to the courts was not unreasonably
hampered. Later cases have gone much further in holding such regula-
Barber v. Page, 239 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Okla. 1965).08See, e.g., Lockhart v. Prasse, 250 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
0o242 F. Supp. 537 (E.D.S.C. 1965). See also Brown v. South Carolina, 286
F. Supp. 998 (E.D.S.C. 1968).
70290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
'250 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
7United States ex rel. Duronio v. Russell, 256 F. Supp. 479 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
" Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1965) (rule of 5 books per cell up-
held); Parks v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
3' 66 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1966).
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tions invalid.75 In Johnson v. Avery7 6 the United States Supreme Court
upheld the right of an inmate to acquire assistance from other prisoners
who were more accomplished in asserting a legal cause. The Court pointed
out that there was no higher duty of governmental authorities than that
of maintaining the writ of habeas corpus unimpaired. Assistance can be
reasonably regulated, the Court said, but not prohibited unless the state
makes alternative7 ' assistance available.7 The Court had previously held
that a state could not limit the availability of a writ to only those
prisoners who could pay a four-dollars filing fee.
79
The issue of the unauthorized practice of law has also been raised in
some cases.8 0 In theory, such an argument is misplaced. The rationale
of prohibiting unauthorized practice is to protect the general public from
unskilled and incompetent persons. A prison population with no pro-
fessional legal assistance available has little to lose from accepting legal
aid from anyone who offers it."'
Absence of Right to Counsel When Appearing Before Prison
Disciplinary Boards
In Nolan v. Scafati,"2 apparently a case of first impression, a federal
district court ruled that a state prisoner does not have a constitutional
right to a lawyer when the prisoner appears before an internal disciplinary
"See Arey v. Peyton, 378 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1967) ; Coonts v. Wainwright,
282 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Fla. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1969); White
v. Blackwell, 277 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
°393 U.S. 483 (1969).
Mr. Justice Fortas' opinion for the Court referred to existing or future legal-
aid programs for prisoners under the auspices of the following law schools: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, University of California at Los Angeles, University of
Kansas, Cornell University, and Vanderbilt University. Harvard University Law
School has recently organized such a program, as has the University of Arkansas.
See 15 A.B.A. STUDENT LAWYER J., Feb. 1970, at 4, 31.
" For more recent decisions, see Wainwright v. Coonts, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th
Cir. 1969); Putt v. Clark, 297 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Ga. 1969). A problem dis-
turbing many prison officials is that writ writers often demand repayment for their
services. Establishment of such debts can lead to fighting and demands for homo-
sexual favors. Comment, The Problems of Modern Pemlogy: Prison Life and
Prisoners' Rights, 54 IowA L. REv. 671, 680 (1967).
" Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), had previously held that a state can-
not condition a writ of habeas corpus on payment of a fee.
"See, e.g., Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1950) ; United States
ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Edmundson v.
Harris, 239 F. Supp. 359 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
" See generally Note, Prison "No Assistance" Regulations and the Jailhouse
Lawyer, 1968 DUKE L.J. 343; Note, 25 WAsR. & LEE L. Rzv. 281 (1968).
" 306 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1969).
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committee of the prison, nor does he have the right to cross-examine those
who have given statements against him or to call witnesses in his own
defense.s3 This decision appears to be in direct conflict with the spirit of
the comments of Chief Justice of the United States Warren Burger in a
recent speech before the National Association of Attorneys General. In
his remarks, the Chief Justice urged the states to adopt simple, workable
procedures that give every aggrieved prisoner a fair hearing.
4
Freedom from Racial Discrimination
Before the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tions5 decided that "separate but equal" is not in fact equal protection
under the law, a petition asserting racial discrimination in prisons would
most likely have been summarily dismissed as without merit. For example,
in United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 8 the court was
not attentive to allegations by Negro inmates that they were denied the
opportunity because of their race to audition as announcers for a radio
program conducted by inmates. And in Nichols v. McGee, 7 decided
almost five years after the decision in Brown, the theory of that case
was rejected in the prison context.
As the impact of Brown began slowly to spread, however, courts
became more receptive to prisoners' allegations of racial discrimina-
tion. s In Lee v. Washington§9 the Supreme Court incisively applied
the rationale of Brown to prisons and invalidated Alabama statutes that
required segregation of the races in prisons and jails. The court refused
to accept the argument that security required such segregation. The federal
courts have subsequently supplemented Lee to guarantee equal protection
for racial minorities. In Rentfrow v. Carter,9 the court refused to allow
" The effect of this decision could be devastating to one sentenced to an in-
determinant term, such as from one to ten years. If falsely accused of some criminal
act or violation of a prison rule, or, what is more likely, framed by the "hard-core"
inmates, he may be forced to serve the full ten years although the sentencing judge
may have contemplated that the prisoner would serve the minimum term and be re-
leased.8,Durham Sun, Feb. 6, 1970, § A, at 10, cols. 1 & 2.
88347 U.S. 483 (1954).
86209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953).
169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 6 (1959).
" See, e.g., Tilden v. Pate, 390 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1968); Rivers v. Royster,
360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966).
8 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
"0See, e.g., Beard v. Lee, 396 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1968).
"1296 F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
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Georgia to utilize a "freedom-of-choice" plan in the desegregation of its
penal institutions. In Wilson v. Kelley,9 2 the court held that the right
of prison authorities to take into account racial tension in maintaining
security, discipline, and order in prisons exists normally only after
outbreaks of violence due to such tension have occurred.
Right to Freedom from Maltreatment and Cruel and
Unusual Punishments
Prison life can subject the inmate to inhumane treatment from two
sources: (1) his keepers or (2) his fellow inmates. Treatment received
during incarceration, whether through intent, apathy, or inadvertence,
may be violative of an inmate's right under the eighth amendment to be
free from cruel and unusual punishments. Regardless of intent or in-
advertence, "[t]he obligation of a State to treat its convicts with
decency and humanity is an absolute one and a federal court will not
overlook a breach of that duty."9 3 Even so, an inmate unlawfully im-
prisoned, or one imprisoned in unsanitary conditions and constantly sub-
jected to brutal mistreatment, has no right to misbehave or to escape.94
However, in United States v. Grimes5. the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has taken the probably unique position that an inmate may
protect himself or his fellow inmates from unwarranted maltreatment
by prison authorities.
In that case, the defendant Grimes had intervened in an altercation in
which two guards were beating an inmate with long flashlights. Grimes,
though using only reasonable force to protect the life of the victim of the
attack, was charged with assault on a correction officer, which is a mis-
demeanor under federal law. The trial court denied a request for an
instruction to the jury that the use of reasonable force to protect a third
party was a complete defense to the crime charged. The Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded, holding that the use of reasonable force against a
prison guard is justified if based on the reasonable belief that such force
is necessary to protect another inmate from an unprovoked assault.96
" 294 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
"8 Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 256 (3d Cir.), rev'd per curiam on other
grounds, 338 U.S. 864, rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 896 (1949).
"'See Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1953); People v.
Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261, 279 P. 1008 (1929).
""413 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1969).
""The ramifications of the case are analyzed in Note, Criminal Law-J--ustifica-
lion for Assault-Defense of Protecting Third Person Held to Apply to Prison
Inm ates, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1034 (1969).
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1. Intentional Maltreatment by Prison Authorities
"The central evil is the unreviewed . . . discretion granted to the
poorly trained personnel who deal directly with prisoners .... Prison
becomes a closed society in which the cruelest of inhumanities exist un-
exposed."" The physical abuse that courts will allow inmates to undergo
has gradually lessened through the ages. Methods of punishment cited
by Blackstone,"' such as dragging the condemned to the place of execution,
public disembowelment, public beheading, quartering and dissecting, or
public cremation of a living victim, no longer are accepted.
In Jackson v. Bishop99 the court took a step toward eliminating modern
physical abuse of convicts by declaring that use of the strap for disciplinary
measures is violative of an inmate's constitutional right to be free from
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. At the Cummins and
Tucker Prison units of the Arkansas Correctional System, regulations
prescribed ten lashes for the offenses of homosexuality, agitation, in-
subordination, making or concealing weapons, refusal to work when
certified to be medically able, and participating in or inciting a riot.
The lashes were given by a prison official using a leather whip 33/2 to 52
feet in length, four inches wide, and one-fourth inch thick, with a twelve-
inch wooden handle. The prisoner was forced to lie face down and the
lashes were applied to his naked buttocks. The court found such whipping
manifestly cruel and unusual to modern man and offensive to "contempo-
rary concepts of decency and human dignity and precepts of civilization
which we profess to possess."
100
In State v. Mincher,"1I decided fifty-three years before Jackson, the
North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a road-gang
guard, who was not authorized by the county commissioners to admin-
ister corporal punishment, for giving a convict twenty lashes across his
bare back. The majority opinion, however, recognized the right of the
county commissioners to authorize such punishment. In his concurring
opinion Chief Justice Clark, opposing all corporal punishment said:
"Prior to the Constitution of 1868 corporal punishment was allowed,
such as branding for manslaughter, cutting off ears for perjury, and
07 Hirshkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, supra note
11, at 811-12.
8 See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments hflicted": The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. Ruv. 839, 862 n.115 (1969).
°404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).100 Id. at 579.
101 172 N.C. 895, 90 S.E. 429 (1916).
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whipping and setting in the stocks for larceny and other crimes; but
in no case without verdict of a jury of twelve impartial men, rendered
in open court, and the sentence of a judge. The advancing civilization
of the age required that corporal punishment, even in such cases and
with such safeguards, should be abolished .... This removed from
our statute book all possibility of whipping or other corporal punish-
ment, even by the verdict of a jury, with the guaranteed right of the
benefit of counsel and the judgment of a court. Certainly it could
not have been contemplated that whipping should be inflicted without
a verdict, without a trial of any kind, and without the sentence of a
court. Such punishment without a jury trial and judgment was un-
known to the law even in the most barbarous days of the common
law.
10 2
The same court, speaking of flogging, said previously in State v. Nipper,
10 3
"That which degrades and embrutes a man cannot be either necessary or
reasonable. 'O'° Faced with maltreatment of a prisoner in State v. Car-
penter,105 the court was forced to reverse the assault conviction of a prison
official for error in the charge to the jury. The defendant was found to
have subjected an inmate to cruel and unusual punishment by handcuffing
him to the bars of his cell by his hands and ankles and leaving him to hang
there for fifty or sixty hours without food and with only a few short
rest periods.
Perhaps the most publicized0 " of prison abuses occurred in Arkansas'
Tucker Prison Farm through the use of the "Tucker telephone," a fear-
some means of communicating the superintendent's displeasure toward an
inmate. The device, originated through the genius of Superintendent
James Burton, consisted of an old-fashioned hand-crank telephone appara-
tus that was wired to the genitals and one of the big toes of a recalcitrant
prisoner. As the crank was spun, the recipient of the message was shocked
almost into a state of unconsciousness. Burton recently pleaded no contest
to a charge that he violated prisoners' rights by administering cruel and
unusual punishment.0 Although he received the maximum sentence,
the actual penalty was far more compassionate than that which he had
himself dealt out: execution of his prison term was suspended. In ex-
1o2 Id. at 900, 90 S.E. at 431 (concurring opinion).
103 166 N.C. 272, 81 S.E. 164 (1914).
10 1 Id. at 275, 81 S.E. at 165.
1 231 N.C. 229, 56 S.E.2d 713 (1949).
"' TImE, Feb. 2, 1970, at 10-11.
10 " Id. The charges were brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964).
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planation of the lenient treatment, the federal judge said, "The court
doesn't want to give you a death sentence, and quite frankly, Mr. Burton,
the chances of your surviving that year would not be good. One or more
of these persons or their friends with whom you have dealt in the past as
inmates of the Arkansas penitentiary would kill you."'08
Several recent cases have raised the issue whether solitary confinement
is cruel and unusual. As a general proposition it is not per se cruel and
unusual: courts tend instead to look at the conditions of the confine-
ment.109 Ninety-nine years in maximum-security confinement may amount
to cruel and unusual treatment according to federal District Judge Miller,
who in December, 1969, required the Tennessee prison authorities to come
up with a plan incorporating "recreation, work, and exercise" for James
Earl Ray, the convicted slayer of Dr. Martin Luther King."' The judge
commented that "[e]nforced idleness can be cruel punishment, particularly
when it is only to protect him from harm.""'
Wright v. McMann" 2 presented a situation in which a form of solitary
confinement subjected an inmate to cruel and unusual punishment. The
inmate was placed in what is termed in prison jargon a "strip cell." De-
nuded, he was exposed to bitter cold for thirty-three days, made to sleep
on a cold concrete floor, forced to remain at military attention from
7:30 a.m. until 10:00 p.m., and deprived of the basic elements of hygiene
such as soap, toilet paper, towels, and a toothbrush. The cell was filthy
and the toilet and sink encrusted with slime, dirt and excremental residue.
The windows of the cell were purposefully left open at night to admit the
sub-freezing air. To the court, the case presented a horrible example
of inhumanity to a fellow human being."'
"o8 Id. The case has not yet been formally reported.
... See, e.g., Ford v. Board of Managers of N.J. State Prison, 407 F.2d 937 (3d
Cir. 1969).
... Durham Sun, Dec. 30, 1969, § A, at 2, cols. 5 & 6.
Id. at col. 6. An equally interesting question is whether the physical, mental,
and psychological strain of an extended term of years on death row would consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment. Two Negroes recently released from Louisiana
State Prison have spent more time on death row than any other American: sixteen
years, two months, and two days. (The previous record of eleven years, ten months,
and eight days was held by Carl Chessman, who was executed in California's
gas chamber in 1960.) Their convictions had been to the United States Supreme
Court four times and were finally reversed on the ground that Negroes were
systematically excluded from the jury that convicted them of the rape of a white
woman in 1950. Durham Sun, Dec. 30, 1969, § B, at 5, cols. 4 & 5.
..2 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
"s The same feeling prompted Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) to exclaim, "The Eighth Amendment ex-
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In Landman v. Peyton,"4 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
refused to find the solitary confinement imposed in that particular case
unconstitutional. But Judge Sobeloff, writing for the majority, was care-
ful to remind prison administrators that they are responsible for the
actions of lower-echelon prison personnel and would be personally
responsible for failure to inform themselves of abuses to inmates in soli-
tary confinement.
2. The Prison Environment
Some judges in the District of Columbia will no longer send non-
aggressive or defenseless criminals into the city's penal institutions because
of the risk that such persons will become the victims of homosexual
attacks, often by gangs of inmates." 5 In relating to news reporters that
a juvenile was gang-raped by eight felons only a few weeks previously,
one federal district court judge said, "I will put them (juveniles) on
probation. I won't expose this type of young man to cruel and unusual
punishment.""'
In Inimates of the Cook County Jail v. Tierney,"11 federal District Court
Judge Julius Hoffman denied motions to dismiss an unusual suit by
inmates against the jail administration. Judge Hoffman said:
The defendants are charged with having failed to maintain the
County jail in a manner consonant with the Constitution and with
other federal standards in that the plaintiffs and other members of
their class have suffered from inadequate food, inadequate light and
heat, a lack of recreation facilities, a lack of adequate facilities for
conference with attorneys, lack of adequate sanitation facilities, a lack
of adequate medical attention, a lack of privacy, an overcrowding,
not to mention the danger of beatings, sexual assaults, burnings, and
other forms of intimidation resulting from an inadequate guard system.
It can no longer be doubted that such asserted debasing conditions
as are described in the complaint would, if proven, constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment."1
8
presses the revulsion of civilized man against barbarous acts-the 'cry of horror'
against man's inhumanity to his fellow man." For a more recent case holding
a similar confinement in a "strip cell" unconstitutional, see Hancock v. Avery, 301
F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
114370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966).
Washington Post, May 4, 1969, § A, at 25, 31 cols. 1, 3.
110 Id., § A, at 31, col. 1.
No. 68, C504 (N.D. Ill. 1968). The case, filed April 8, 1968, has never been
formally reported.
" Id. Statement taken from transcript of the proceedings, Aug. 22, 1968, at
16-17.
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The problem of sex, or, more correctly, the absence of any satisfying
sexual relationships for prisoners, has been a constant problem for prison
administrators:
To confine a man apart from the female sex, in constant contact with
other men, will produce what is known as deprivation homosexuality.
This has been seen in prison camps, and men will become homosexual
in their behavior, although they usually revert to heterosexuality on
discharge when they can mix with women again. Such a thing hap-
pened, also, in the old sailing ships when men were away at sea for
long voyages lasting perhaps a year or two at a time, and among
cowboys of the Old West in America. Such deprivation at sea not
only led to homosexual acts between the members of the crew, but
to wild outbreaks of heterosexuality when the sailors managed to get
ashore." 9
There were approximately one thousand sexual assaults between inmates
in federal prisons reported during 1961.120 There is no reliable estimate
of the number in state prison units although cases reporting such assaults
are numerous.' 2 ' In view of this tendency of prisoners to turn to homo-
sexual activity, Philadelphia Judge Raymond Alexander recently urged his
fellow members of the bench and bar to consider permitting conjugal visits
as a means of restoring a measure of sexual normalcy to inmates. Sex in
jail between husbands and wives, he said, "is desirable and would make
a convict's future life worth living. Otherwise a prisoner won't be worth
a damn. We'll be sending monsters out into the community.
1 22
Arguably, the state has no right to punish a social deviant by im-
prisoning him in an environment in which he may in all probabilty become
a homosexual.12' Although voluntary homosexuality requires a degree of
"' Allen, Should We Allow Sex for Prisoners, Sexology, Nov. 1969, at 17-20.
Dr. Allen is a well known British psychiatrist and author of numerous textbooks
on deviant sexual behavior.
120 Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial RefitSal
to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 546 (1963).
121 See, e.g., Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952). A young Alabama Negro
was allegedly forced to serve as a "gal-boy" or female for homosexual inmates.
The Supreme Court refused to decide the merits because there was no showing that
the inmate had exhausted his remedies in the state courts of Alabama. See also
Muniz v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Johnson v. United
States, 258 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Va. 1966).
.2. Allen, Should We Allow Sex for Prisoners, supra note 119, at 17.
12 See generally Comment, The Problem of Modern Penology: Prison Life
and Prisoners' Rights, 53 IowA L. Pcav. 671, 698 (1968). Estimates of the number
of inmates who engage in homosexual activities range as high as eighty per cent.
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consent on the part of the participants, only the state can shoulder 'the
blame for failing to protect an inmate from depraved sexual atrocities per-
formed upon him by his fellow inmates. Such assaults are common in any
prison; the North Carolina system is no exception.
A case in point is the cruel indoctrination of a 17 year old boy into a
North Carolina prison unit. Found guilty of a misdemeanor, the boy
was committed to the misdemeanor section of a correctional unit. As
a misdemeanant he was assigned to a 'dormitory,' rather than to an
individual cell like a convicted felon .... Shortly after his arrival at
the unit, when the lights were turned off in the dormitory he was
brutally "raped" by a group of older homosexuals after being threat-
ened with bodily harm if he made any noise and did not submit.
1 24
The boy became a constant disciplinary problem so that he would be
placed in solitary confinement and thus beyond the reach of the aggressors.
However, his misbehavior prevented early parole. His attempts to avoid
his aggressors being too often frustrated, he twice attempted suicide. To
protect such individuals, North Carolina has developed an "I.C. Unit"
to allow privacy and security.
25
Muniz v. United States 26 is a recent case indicating the reluctance of
the courts to require a warden to isolate inmates solely because of homo-
sexual inclinations in order to protect other prisoners. An action was
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act 1 27 by an inmate who was
12 'Ashman, The "I.C. Unit" New Device to Provide Protection, 32 POPULAR
GOVERNMENT 5 (Apr. 1966). "I.C." stands for individual cell.
... Id. However, few of these units are now in existence, primarily because
of the cost and a lack of legislative sympathy. See also Britt, A Case to Ilhstrate
the Need for Single Cells in Prison Correctional Prograns, 32 POPULAR GOVERN-
MENT 2 (Apr. 1966).
After a thorough investigation of the North Carolina prison system, a reporter
for The Charlotte Observer recently wrote that
[s]omewhere in North Carolina's prison system this week a boy will be
raped-maybe once, possibly three or four times in one night by different
men. Somewhere behind the bars an effeminate young man too weak or
too scared to fight back will be auctioned as a homosexual partner ....
The victim might be serving as little as 30 days for public drunkenness. He
might be a high school student from a "good home" who stole a car. He
might be a businessman who was a solid citizen until he stole some money
in one moment of desperation.
Charlotte Observer, March 30-April 9, 1969 (Series Reprint) at 2. North Caro-
lina Commissioner of Correction Bounds has admitted the accuracy of this re-
port: "[I]f someone were to put me on the stand tomorrow and ask me if it were
true, then I would have to say that I believe it is true." Id.
." 280 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
12728 U.S.C. §§ 1346(d), 2671-80 (1964).
1970]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
beaten by a group of eleven other convicts when he tried to protect a
friend from homosexual attacks by a member of the gang. In an attempt
to prove negligence on the part of prison officials, the inmate argued
that prison authorities were under a duty to isolate known homosexuals
for the protection of the general inmate population. Denying relief, the
court said, "No authority has been discovered requiring a warden to isolate
inmates solely because of their homosexual inclinations in order to pro-
tect other inmates or from fear of such unanticipated acts as occurred here,
including the assaultive proclivities or acts of the other inmates."' 2 8 In
any custodial situation, however, the general rule is that the warden or
jailer is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure the safety
of his prisoners. He can be held accountable for tort damages for subject-
ing prisoners to dangers from other inmates of which he is or should be
aware.1
2 9
An equal-protection argument by a prisoner seeking to impose a duty
on prison officials to protect him from assaults would probably have less
persuasive effect upon a court80 than would a camplaint based upon the
eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
In Holt v. Sarver4 the court faced squarely the issue of the state's duty
under the eighth amendment to protect inmates. At the Cummins Farm
Unit of the Arkansas State Penitentiary, prisoners were placed in large
barracks at night. The court said:
Since the inmates sleep together in the barracks, an inmate has
ready access to any other inmate sleeping in the same barracks. Many
of the inmates have weapons of one sort of another ....
"' Muniz v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 542, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In Johnson
v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Va. 1966), the court rejected an ingenious
attempt by a homosexual inmate to impose a duty upon penal institution authorities
to protect him from the adverse effects of his own conduct. The inmate, who had
a reputation for homosexual attacks on others, was beaten and stabbed by a gang
of vindictive heterosexuals.
.2 See, e.g., Glover v. Hazelwood, 387 S.W.2d 600 (Ky. 1964) (person jailed
for drunkenness and placed in cell with convicted murderer); Julian v. State, 98
So.2d 284 (La. Ct. App. 1957) (inmate placed in cell with mentally deranged con-
vict and slashed to death with knife that jailer had negligently failed to discover) ;
Dunn v. Swanson, 217 N.C. 279, 7 S.E.2d 563 (1940) (weak prisoner locked in a
cell with one violentlly insane); Taylor v. Slaughter, 171 Okla. 152, 42 P.2d 235
(1935) (jailer allowed "kangaroo court" of inmates to beat other inmates at
will).
"' See Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1969), in which the court held
that the failure of a warden to protect a particular inmate from attack by a fellow
inmate did not deprive the victim of equal protection of the laws.
1.1 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
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At times deadly feuds arise between particular inmates, and if one
of them can catch his enemy asleep it is easy to crawl over and stab
him. Inmates who commit such assaults are known as "crawlers" and
"creepers," and other inmates live in fear of them.
The Court is of the view that if the State of Arkansas chooses to
confine penitentiary inmates in barracks with other inmates, they
ought at least to be able to fall asleep at night without fear of having
their throats cut before morning, and that the State has failed to
discharge a constitutional duty in failing to take steps to enable them
to do so.
182
The court gave the state corrections commissioner thirty days to set forth
a plan to comply with constitutional requirements.
3. Medical Care
Serious deprivation of human rights occurs if prison officials fail to
provide satisfactory medical care for inmates. The eighth amendment
has been interpreted as imposing a duty to provide adequate medical
care,13 but prison officials are vested with wide discretion in determining
the nature and character of medical treatment to be afforded prisoners.3'
In Mayfield v. Cravenie the court held that medical personnel may be
liable for improper nonmedical treatment of prisoners; for unjustifiable
refusal to provide medical care; or for medical treatment that is so
obviously inadequate as to amount to a refusal of urgently needed care or
so obviously improper as to evidence a design to aggravate the prisoner's
condition. The court went on to say that judges are not empowered to
substitute their judgment for that of a licensed physician as to the
propriety of a particular course of treatment afforded a prisoner-patient
under his care. However, a prison physician may be sued in state courts
for malpractice. In Irwin v. BursoY36 it was clearly indicated that the
narrow test whereby federal judges refuse to substitute their judgment
1
1 2 Id. at 830-31.
... See Blanks v. Cunningham, 409 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1969); Riley v. Rhay,
407 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1969); Schack v. Florida, 391 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 916 (1968); Snow v. Gladden, 338 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1964);
Carter v. United States, 283 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Coleman v. Johnston, 247
F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957) ; Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) ;
McCollum v.Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Gordon v. Garrison,
77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948).
... United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Ragen, 323 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963)..8 299 F. Supp. 1111, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 1969).
10 389 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1967).
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for that of prison physicians simply precludes the intervention of the
federal courts, but that the inmate was free to pursue a tort suit in the
state courts against the prison physician, who allegedly negligently exposed
the prisoner to x-rays.
4. Tests for Determining What Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In summary, "[t] he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment
is nothing less than the dignity of man.1 137 The totality of all circum-
stances affecting a prisoner should be examined in light of one of the
following three tests138 developed by the courts: (1) Do the circumstances
amount to treatment that shocks the conscience of the court and violates
concepts of fairness and decency?' (2) Is the treatment disproportionate
to the crime?14 (3) Does the treatment go beyond that necessary to
effect legitimate penal goals ?141 Convicts, after all, are sentenced to prison
as punishment and not for additional punishment. 142
Miscellaneous Rights
The internal administration of prison affairs is generally beyond the
bounds of judicial review. Thus, the state has the power to classify and
confiscate all personal property received by an inmate from the outside
as contraband.14 3 Prison authorities have the discretion to prevent state
prisoners from converting a federal bond into cash and to regulate the
amount of money that an inmate is allowed to have while incarcerated. 44
They may also regulate the number of letters each inmate may accumulate
at any given time. 45 Likewise, the number of books or magazines that
each inmate may possess can be regulated,'146 and receipt of out-of-state
'"'Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
1. See, Note, Criminal Law-Cruel and Untsual Punishment-Court Adopts
Federal Test, 58 Ky. L.J. 93 (1969).
... Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F.
Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
" Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
.' Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
1" Britt, A Case to Illustrate the Need for Single Cells in Prison Correctional
Program, 32 POPULAR: GOVERNMENT 2, 4 (Apr. 1966).
... Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 285 F. Supp. 585, 597 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (watch);
Taylor v. Burke, 278 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (family photo album).
"' Aragon v. Wathen, 352 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1965).
'United States ex rel. Lee v. Illinois, 343 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1965).
... Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1965) (five books per cell) ; Parks
v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (twenty-five paperbacks and/or
magazines at one time).
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newspapers can be prohibited. 147 An inmate does not have the right to
own or use a typewriter, 148 or, in fact, any personal property. 49
In Wilson v. Kelley.5 the court held in essence that an inmate has
-no right to be rehabilitated. The court said that the state has no absolute
duty toward its inmates other than to exercise ordinary care for their
-protection and to keep them safe and free from harm and that humane
efforts to rehabilitate should not be discouraged by requiring that every
-prisoner must be treated exactly alike. Furthermore, a prisoner has no
right to remain in any particular prison unit and can be shuttled about
in the discretion of prison authorities.' 5'
Despite the adverse authority in Wilson, a complaint 52 was filed
recently in the Court of Common Pleas, Richland County, South Caro-
lina, by an inmate for himself and all other inmates similarly situated
in county prison camps. The complaint alleges that the procedure whereby
inmates are chosen to go to work camps, rather than to institutions of the
State Department of Corrections that are equipped with a rehabilitative
program of academics, recreation, sports, and social and vocational
activities, is arbitrary and capricious and therefore constitutes a denial
of equal protection. The petitioner, sentenced to nine years and assigned
to a work camp, is destined to serve his penalty working South Carolina
roads. He is making an assertion of a right to rehabilitative treatment.
Final disposition of the case is pending.
While the right of a prisoner to receive treatment designed to rehabili-
tate him has not yet been established, it is fairly clear that a prisoner
who is criminally insane is entitled to psychiatric treatment.
153
There exists no right of prisoners to protest--even peacefully; inmates
attempting to organize a collective demonstration against purported
irregularities at a prison can be punished.'54
The authority of prison administrators to select the "proper" visitors
for inmates has been said to be unquestionable-even a wife can be ex-
" United States ex rel. Oakes v. Taylor, 274 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
... Parks v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
"'Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 285 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Taylor v.
Burke, 278 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Wis. 1968)."' 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
..1 United States ex rel. Stuart v. Yeager, 293 F. Supp. 1079 (D.N.J. 1968).
1'° McLamore v. Leeke, Court of Common Pleas, Richland County, South Caro-
lina, petition filed September, 1969.
.. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
. Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 877 (1967).
1970]
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cluded. 5  Also, the visitation privileges of one on death row can be
terminated. 5 s
There is some recent authority that money can be taken from a
prisoner's work fund to cover expenses incurred by the state in recapturing
and returning him after his escape.'5 7 However, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held over thirty years ago that the state could not recover
such expenses from a prisoner.1 58 The court said that recapturing escaped
prisoners is a public duty required by law for which public funds have
been appropriated.' 59
Some states have so-called "civil-death" statutes,60  which generally
declare a convict civilly dead so that he is deprived of a right to contract,
to take or hold property, or to bring a civil action. In many states having
such statutes, conviction of a felony and a lengthy sentence to prison auto-
matically terminates the existence of the prisoner's marriage instead of
merely being grounds for divorce.' In most states, even those that do
not have civil-death statutes, a convicted felon faces the probability of
temporary or permanent disenfranchisement. 2
REMEDIES
"The existence of prisoner rights provides small solace unless they can
be translated into reality.' 01 3 When an inmate's rights have been un-
reasonably abused or altogether denied, the most crucial issue facing him
is what remedy to pursue in redress of the wrong. The following dis-
cussion is devoted to remedies that a prisoner is most likely to pursue. 10 4
.. Akamine v. Murphy, 108 Cal. App. 2d 294, 238 P.2d 606 (1951).
... Labat v. McKeithen, 361 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel.
Raymond v. Rundle, 276 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
... Sigler v. Lowrie, 404 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1968).
..8 See North Carolina State Hwy. and Pub. Works Comm'n. v. Cobb, 215
N.C. 556, 2 S.E.2d 565 (1939), in which the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that the state could not recover from a prisoner expenses incurred in his recapture.
11" Id. at 559, 2 S.E.2d at 567.
.00 For a detailed discussion of civil-death statutes, see generally Comment, The
Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BUFFALO L. REv. 397 (1965).1 1 See Zizzo v. Zizzo, 41 Misc. 2d 928, 247 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Sup. Ct. 1964). See
also Garner v. Schulte Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 127, 259 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1965).
10. See generally Comment, The Ex-Convict's Right to Vote, 40 S. CAL. L.
REV. 148 (1967). See also N.C. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2(3).
10. Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 985, 1004 (1962).
... The major focus of this comment is upon the rights of prisoners. The dis-
cussion of remedies will be far from dispositive. The reader should refer to the
cases cited in the section on prisoners' rights to ascertain the remedies pursued.
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The Federal Tort Claims and Prisoner Compensation Acts
Congress, through the Federal Tort Claims Act, 6 ' has eliminated the
sovereign immunity of the United States from suit by anyone injured due
to certain types of tortious conduct by a federal employee. Until 1963,
courts had consistently refused to allow prisoners in federal penitentiaries
to recover under the Act,', but in United States v. MuniZ1 67 the United
States Supreme Court disapproved this judicial reluctance. Two cases'
68
were brought by prisoners under the Act. The United States applied
to the United States Supreme Court for writs of certiorari to contest
adverse decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The
Court affirmed awards to both prisoners under the Act. Muniz was
permitted to recover for injuries sustained when he was beaten by fellow
inmates after being locked in a dormitory by a negligent guard during a
prison riot. The other prisoner, Winston, was allowed to recover for
loss of his vision caused by a brain tumor; he had constantly complained
of headaches to the prison physician, who had negligently failed to take
any action.
One of the highest recoveries by a prisoner under the Federal Tort
Claims Act went to underworld figure Mickey Cohen, who received a
110,000-dollar judgment for injury inflicted on him by another inmate
due to the negligence of federal prison authorities, who failed to take
proper security precautions in confining the attacker, an extremely
dangerous and violent inmate.'6 9
The Prisoner Compensation Act of 1958170 provides coverage similar
to state workmen's compensation statutes for prisoners actually engaged
in work in prison industry and maintenance who are injured on the job.
In United States v. Demko171 the Supreme Court held that recovery un-
der this Act bars any further recovery under the Federal Tort Claims
Act.
10528 U.S.C. §§ 1346(d), 2671-80 (1964).
See generally Note, Prisoner in Federal Penitentiary May Sue Under Federal
Tort Claints Act, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 144 (1963); Note, Administrative Law:
Torts: Federal Tort Clains Act: Prisoner Suits, 48 CO1RNELL L.Q. 525 (1963);
Note, Federal Tort Claims Act-In General-Federal Prisoner May Sue United
States for Injuries Resulting from Negligence of Prison Physician, 76 HARV: L.
REv. 413 (1962).
107374 U.S. 150 (1963).
..8 Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1962); Winston v. United
States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962).
... Cohen v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
170 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1964).
'385 U.S. 149 (1966).
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Habeas Corpus to Federal District Courts
The writ of habeas corpus' is the most commonly used of the tradi-
tional remedies in cases of alleged mistreatment of prisoners.7  Until
1944, the writ was ordinarily refused unless the prisoner's application
challenged the validity of his confinement instead of the manner.'74 Since
then, the federal district courts have begun to follow Coffin v. Reichard,175
in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit said, "Any unlawful
restraint of personal liberty may be inquired into on habeas corpus ....
This rule applies although a person is in lawful custody. His conviction
and incarceration deprive him only of such liberties as the law has ordained
he shall suffer for his transgressions."'
176
In Johnson v. Avery17 Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for the Supreme
Court, said in reference to the writ that "there is no higher duty to main-
tain it unimpaired.' 78 However, the availability of the writ to prisoners
apparently has begun to burden unduly the federal courts. Chief Justice
Burger recently stated that prisoners' habeas corpus petitions to federal
courts usually are without merit and have been "sand, if not gravel, in
federal-state relationships.' 79
Provisions of Civil Rights Acts
Because of the hesitancy of states to prosecute their own prison
authorities for atrocities, which incumbent state politicians would under-
standably prefer to keep quiet, the majority of prosecutions involving
brutality to prisoners are brought under title 18, section 242, of the
United States Code (the Civil Rights Act of 1948), which provides as
follows:
"Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, willfully subjects any inhabitants of any State, Territory, or
District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
17228 U.S.C. §2242 (1964) provides a simple procedure for application to
federal district courts for the writ, the major condition being that the application
must be in writing and verified.
S11See generally Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing
Law, 110 U. PA. L. R-v. 985 (1962).
...See generally, Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for
State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960).
1 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
1
7
6 Id. at 445.
.77 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
.8 Id. at 485, quoting Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939).
..9 Durham Sun, Feb. 6, 1970, § A, at 10, cols. 1&2.
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secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States
... shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment
for any term of years or for life."'u 0
State prison authorities have been convicted under this section for willful
physical mistreatment of prisoners, willful failure to protect prisoners
from third persons, and willful extortion of prisoners' funds.'81
Title 42, section 1983, of the Code (the Civil Rights Act of 1871)8
provides a basis on which prisoners can recover civil damages from
prison officials. The section reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
8 3
Remedies in State Courts
Although prisoners seem hesitant to pursue remedies in state courts,
habeas corpus, mandamus, and other traditional forms of relief are gen-
erally available.8 4 Prison personnel guilty of intentional maltreatment or
criminal negligence are subject to prosecution in state courts for violation
of the state criminal code. Some jurisdictions allow inmates to assert
1180 18 U.'S.C. § 242 (1964).
"I For cases brought pursuant to this section see, e.g., United States v. Jackson,
235 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.
1953); Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951); United States v.
Apodaca, 188 F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1951); United States v. Walker, 121 F. Supp.
458 (N.D. Fla. 1954); Gordon v. Garrison, 77 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Ill. 1948). See
also Caldwell and Brodie, Enforcement of the Criminal Civil Rights Statute, 18
U.S.C. Section 242, in Prison Brutality Cases, 52 GEo. L.J. 706 (1964).
1242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
88 Id. It should be noted that only a person and not a state can be sued under
this section. For cases brought pursuant to this section see, e.g., Abernathy v.
Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1968); Irwin v. Burson, 389 F.2d 63 (5th
Cir. 1967); Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1967); Kent v. Prasse,
385 F.2d 406 (3d Cir. 1967); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967);
Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967); Brown v. Brown, 368 F.2d 992
(9th Cir. 1966); Medlock v. Burke, 285 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Taylor v.
Burke, 278 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 868
(E.D. Ark. 1967).
... See generally Note, A Prisoner's Right to Sue for Personal Injuries, 41
TEMP. L.Q. 222 (1968).
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civil claims under a state tort claims act."8 5 For example, North Carolina
has such an act, 8 6 which provides for a maximum recovery of fifteen
thousand dollars. In Gould v. North State Highway and Public Works
Commission, s7 the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld an award un-
der the tort claims statute of three thousand dollars to the estate of a
prisoner for her wrongful death, which was caused by a state employee
who was acting within the scope of his employment. Unreasonable force
used in subduing the female inmate had resulted in a neck injury causing
her death. The holding of this case would seem to remove any doubt in
regard to whether a prisoner could recover under the North Carolina act.
Inmates also have the alternative of bringing a civil action in the state
courts of North Carolina against individual prison officials. In State ex
rel. Dunn v. Swansoi' s a jailer and the sheriff's surety were held liable
for the death of a prisoner who was placed in a cell with a violently in-
sane man who killed the prisoner by beating him with a table leg torn
from a table in the cell. In State ex rel. West v. Ingle'"9 the complaint
of a prisoner alleging that he was negligently slung from a garbage truck
on which he was riding as his work assignment was found to state a cause
of action against the driver, the superintendent of the prison farm, and
the surety on their bonds. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
also held that members of the state prison commission and the director
of prisons are not immune from suit. 9 0
CONCLUSION
The pressing problem in the correctional setting today is that of
societal ignorance, apathy, and indifference to the deficiencies inherent in
the nature of the existing prison system. Inmates are presently entitled
"' With regard to suits under the tort claims statute in New York, see Green
v. State, 278 N.Y. 15, 14 N.E.2d 833 (1938).
In a recent case, an inmate of the New York prison system, by what correctional
officials termed a "tragic mistake," was confined to prison for thirty-four years for
stealing candy worth five dollars as a boy of sixteen. The sentence was twenty-four
years more than the maximum term for the crime. Now, at age 60, he is suing the
State of New York for 115,000 dollars as partial compensation for "the lifetime
he could never enjoy." Durham Sun, Dec. 23, 1969, § B, at 7, col. 1.
' N.C. GuN. STAT. § 143-291 (Supp. 1969). See also N.C. Guxq. STAT. §§ 148-82
to -84 (1964) which compensate one wrongfully convicted of a felony.
" 245 N.C. 350, 95 S.E.2d 910 (1957). See also Ivey v. North Carolina Prison
Dep't, 252 N.C. 615, 114 S.E.2d 812 (1960).
188 217 N.C. 279, 7 S.E.2d 563 (1940).
... 269 N.C. 447, 152 S.E.2d 476 (1967).
180 Parr v. Garibaldi, 252 N.C. 803, 115 S.E.2d 18 (1960).
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only to the skeletal remains of the state purse and most are thus destined
to remain forever "dregs" of society in antiquated institutions that do
little for criminals other than prepare them for a recidivist career.' 91 In-
deed, the cause of some American domestic turmoil could well be "years
of neglect ... for our system of correction."
M9 2
A fundamental right of all inmates, implied in the eighth amendment,
is the preservation of individual dignity. The prevalence of sexual attack
and other assaults by inmates on other prisoners emphasizes the failure
of the state to preserve this right. The premise of this comment has been:
If a man is going to be convicted of a crime and stripped of his liberty
by society's law, then we must enable him to live in an environment
where he can depend on the law to protect him-not in a lawless
society where he survives only by breaking the law, where the law is
fear.
193
The duty of the state seems clear: it must either provide a safe environ-
ment for those whom it deems necessary to incarcerate, or else it must
devise some alternative method to vindicate the public conscience when a
criminal abuses the social order.'94 At present neither has been accom-
plished to any adequate degree. 95 It is highly unlikely that judicial inter-
"' The idea was espoused in a speech by Chief Justice Warren Burger at the
American Bar Association's annual meeting, Dallas, Texas, 1969. 14 Am. BAR.
NEws (Dec. 1969), at 1.
..2 Statement by President Segal, American Bar Association, in an address be-
fore the Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, December 5, 1969. 14 Am.
BAR NEws (Dec. 1969), at 1.
... Charlotte Observer, supra note 125, at 24.
... Arguably only those who present a danger to the community or those com-
miting heinous crimes should be incarcerated. The public conscience could be
reasonably satisfied by restricting a man's liberty (for example through parole or
probation) rather than taking it away completely. This solution has an economic
appeal as well. It costs 72 cents per day to supervise a parolee in North Carolina,
but 5.68 dollars per day are required to confine an inmate in prison. An average
annual saving of six million dollars would result by placing most prisoners on
parole. In addition, the 3,300 parolees in North Carolina earned 6.4 million dollars
in taxable income in 1968, and because they were employed, the state and counties
saved 218,220 dollars in welfare payments to their dependents. Id. at 13. The
savings that would result if only dangerous criminals were incarcerated could
be employed to provide suitable facilities for those actually imprisoned.
... However. North Carolina Commissioner of Correction Bounds has added
this degree of optimism:
I am confident that an adequately informed public will not permit these
conditions to continue. The widespread support required for the extirpation
of evils rooted in an era of penological history which was characterized by
step-chains, striped clothing, and brutal punishment arbitrarily administered
by prison personnel unfit for the functions assigned-to them, can be effected
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